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The two forms of visuo-spatial perspective taking are 
differently embodied and subserve different spatial 
prepositions
Klaus Kessler* and Hannah Rutherford
Institute of Neuroscience and Psychology, Social Interaction Research Centre, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK
We set out to distinguish level 1 (VPT-1) and level 2 (VPT-2) perspective taking with respect to 
the embodied nature of the underlying processes as well as to investigate their dependence 
or independence of response modality (motor vs. verbal). While VPT-1 reflects understanding 
of what lies within someone else’s line of sight, VPT-2 involves mentally adopting someone 
else’s spatial point of view. Perspective taking is a high-level conscious and deliberate mental 
transformation that is crucially placed at the convergence of perception, mental imagery, 
communication, and even theory of mind in the case of VPT-2. The differences between VPT-1 
and VPT-2 mark a qualitative boundary between humans and apes, with the latter being capable 
of VPT-1 but not of VPT-2. However, our recent data showed that VPT-2 is best conceptualized as 
the deliberate simulation or emulation of a movement, thus underpinning its embodied origins. 
In the work presented here we compared VPT-2 to VPT-1 and found that VPT-1 is not at all, or very 
differently embodied. In a second experiment we replicated the qualitatively different patterns 
for VPT-1 and VPT-2 with verbal responses that employed spatial prepositions. We conclude that 
VPT-1 is the cognitive process that subserves verbal localizations using “in front” and “behind,” 
while VPT-2 subserves “left” and “right” from a perspective other than the egocentric. We 
further conclude that both processes are grounded and situated, but only VPT-2 is embodied in 
the form of a deliberate movement simulation that increases in mental effort with distance and 
incongruent proprioception. The differences in cognitive effort predict differences in the use of 
the associated prepositions. Our findings, therefore, shed light on the situated, grounded and 
embodied basis of spatial localizations and on the psychology of their use.
Keywords: grounding, embodiment, movement simulation, perspective taking, social cognition, spatial language
These examples point out the importance of VPT in 
 communication, e.g., for establishing a common reference frame 
for understanding spatial localizations or more generally for estab-
lishing a shared view of the world (Frith and Frith, 2007). VPT-2 is 
regarded as the more complex process of the two, which is evidenced 
by a later ontogenetic development, specific difficulties experienced 
by autistic children, and by phylogenetic differences. VPT-1 develops 
around the age of 2 years and autistic children do not experience 
particular difficulties with this task (Leslie and Frith, 1988; Baron-
Cohen, 1989). In contrast, VPT-2 develops around 4–5 years (Gzesh 
and Surber, 1985; Hamilton et al., 2009), but not in children diag-
nosed with autism spectrum disorder (ASD), and VPT-2 perform-
ance is predicted by theory of mind (ToM) score (Hamilton et al., 
2009). Primates seem capable of certain forms of VPT-1 but not at 
all of VPT-2 (Tomasello et al., 2005). The latter conforms to their 
inability to perform simple ToM tasks (Call and Tomasello, 1999), 
which pose no problem for 5-year-old (non-autistic) children.
However, primates (Tomasello et al., 1998; Brauer et al., 2005) 
and other species (Scheumann and Call, 2004; Pack and Herman, 
2006) have been reported to physically align their perspective with 
humans. Apes even deliberately change their position to be able 
to look around obstacles and share what a human experimenter 
can see (Tomasello et al., 1998; Brauer et al., 2005). This reflects 
IntroductIon
In this study we set out to investigate the differences between two 
forms of visuo-spatial perspective taking in terms of embodied 
processing and regarding the consequences for the situated and 
grounded use of projective spatial prepositions (i.e., “left,” ”right,” 
“in front,” and ”behind”).
Flavell et al. (1986) have categorized the ability to understand 
someone else’s visuo-spatial perspective into level 1 and level 2 
perspective taking (VPT). While level 1 (VPT-1) reflects under-
standing of what lies within someone else’s line-of-sight, i.e., which 
objects are visible and which occluded (“I know what you can see;” 
see Figure 1), level 2 (VPT-2) involves mentally adopting someone 
else’s spatial point of view and understanding how the world is rep-
resented from this virtual perspective (i.e., “I see the world through 
your eyes”) as shown in Figure 1. As another example please imag-
ine we would like to tell a friend that she has an eyelash on her left 
cheek, which would require determining “left” and “right” from 
our friend’s perspective – independently from our own point of 
view. Or think of way descriptions, where an instruction like “in 
front of the building turn left” assumes that the instructing and the 
instructed persons are aligned into the same virtual perspective, i.e., 
that they both either mentally face the entrance from the outside 
or imagine coming out of the building.
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mind is grounded in mechanisms that evolved for interaction with 
the environment – that is, mechanisms of sensory processing and 
motor control” (Wilson, 2002, p. 626).
In the experiments presented here we compared VPT-1 and VPT-2 
in terms of their embodiment. While we expected to replicate the evi-
dence for movement simulation/emulation subserving VPT-2 we did 
not know whether a similar process would also subserve VPT-1. In 
fact, the onto- and phylogenetic differences we have mentioned above 
suggested that the underlying processes could differ quite substantially 
and Michelon and Zacks (2006) provided conclusive evidence for a 
qualitative difference between VPT-1 and VPT-2: Congruent to our 
previous findings (Kessler and Thomson, 2010) and to results reported 
by others (Huttenlocher and Presson, 1973; Levine et al., 1982) VPT-2 
showed an increase in reaction times with increasing angular disparity, 
while reaction times in the VPT-1 task remained flat across angles.
Michelon and Zacks (2006) concluded that VPT-1 is based on 
imagining the other person’s line-of-sight which determines the 
relevant inter-object spatial relations, while VPT-2 requires some 
sort of mental rotation. A very similar distinction was suggested by 
the basic understanding that a physical (apes) or mental effort 
(humans, i.e., VPT-2) is sometimes necessary in order to under-
stand someone else’s view of the world (Frith and Frith, 2007), 
which led us to hypothesize that VPT-2 might have originated 
from deliberate physical alignment of perspectives exhibited by 
apes (Kessler and Thomson, 2010).
We reasoned that if this was the case then VPT-2 would still be 
an “embodied” process in the sense that it relies on the posture 
and action repertoire of the body. Our recent findings (Kessler 
and Thomson, 2010) have indeed confirmed that although VPT-2 
is a high-level cognitive process it is not a purely abstract trans-
formation of a reference frame or coordinate system as had been 
the established view within linguistics/computational linguistics 
(Retz-Schmidt, 1988). Instead, we found substantial evidence that 
VPT-2 is relying on action-related and proprioceptive representa-
tions of the body. Specifically, we altered the body posture of the 
participants before each trial (cf. Figure 2) so that their body was 
either congruent or incongruent (in some experiments also neu-
tral) with the direction of VPT-2. This simple manipulation had 
a dramatic effect on reaction times, where a congruent posture 
speeded up processing while an incongruent slowed it down. Based 
on the pattern of results across four experiments, we concluded that 
the embodiment of VPT-2 is best conceptualized as the deliberate 
emulation or simulation of a body rotation, supporting the notion 
of endogenous sensorimotor embodiment (Kessler and Thomson, 
2010). This conforms to Wilson’s sixth and most powerful mean-
ing of embodied cognition: “6. Off-line cognition is body based. 
Even when decoupled from the environment, the activity of the 
Figure 1 | Level 1 vs. level 2 perspective taking. According to Flavell et al. 
(1986) level 1 perspective taking (VPT-1) requires understanding of what lies 
within someone else’s line-of-sight. Level 2 (VPT-2) involves mentally adopting 
someone else’s spatial point of view. Determining that the flower is on the 
“right” of the tree from the other person’s perspective requires a more complex 
transformation than VPT-1. VPT-2 has been generally related to tasks that require 
relative judgments and which prominently include verbal localizations that use 
“left of” and “right of” (Michelon and Zacks, 2006). In contrast, VPT-1 has been 
related so far only to visibility judgments, but we propose that VPT-1 also 
extends to the language domain and subserves verbal localizations that use  
“in front of” and “behind of.” Further explanations in the text.
Q2
Figure 2 | Stimuli (top four images) and posture manipulations (drawings 
at the bottom). The top two images show examples for VPT-2, i.e., the target 
(red) is left (left image) and right (right image), respectively, from the avatar’s 
perspective. The two images below show two examples for VPT-1: the target is 
either visible (left image) or occluded (right image) to the avatar. These stimuli 
were used in both Experiments. In Experiment 1, participants pressed a key to 
indicate whether the target was visible/occluded (VPT-1) or left/right (VPT-2). The 
same stimuli were used in Experiment 2 where participants responded verbally 
whether the target was “in front”/“behind” or “left”/”right” of the occlusion from 
the avatar’s perspective. Conform to Kessler and Thomson (2010) we employed 
several angular disparities (60, 110, 160, 200, 250, 300) and a manipulation of the 
participant’s body posture (congruent vs. incongruent to the direction of the 
avatar’s location) as shown at the bottom. Further explanations in the text.
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“behind,” which has been shown to be the case (Herrmann et al., 
1987; Bryant et al., 1992). Furthermore, if the assumption is cor-
rect that VPT-1 is the underlying process, then response times for 
“visible” judgments should be faster than for “occluded.”
Our first two steps to investigate the proposed link between the 
two horizontal dimensions of projective prepositions and the two 
levels of VPT were as follows. Firstly, we aimed to show that VPT-1 
and VPT-2 are indeed differently embodied cognitive processes. 
Secondly, we aimed to replicate our effects using a verbal response 
(i.e., participants saying “left,” “right,” “in front,” or “behind”) in 
order to test our assumption that “left”/”right” is subserved by 
VPT-2 whereas “in front”/”behind” by VPT-1. So far we had exclu-
sively employed spatially mapped key presses for VPT-2 (Kessler and 
Thomson, 2010). We expected that the embodiment effect observed 
in these experiments would persist as we believed it to be a defining 
characteristic of VPT-2 that did not depend on the response modal-
ity. However, a result to the contrary would be important, forcing 
us to adjust our theoretical considerations. It would mean that only 
in the case of a spatially mapped motor response a body rotation 
is fully simulated (cf. Kessler and Thomson, 2010), while in the 
case of a verbal response VPT-2 could rely on the transformation 
of a more abstract “disembodied” (e.g., geometric) representation 
of the egocentric perspective (e.g., Mahon and Caramazza, 2008). 
Qualitative differences in spatial representation updating after a 
physical or an imagined self-rotation have indeed been reported for 
motor (pointing) vs. verbal (“left”/”right”) responses (de Vega and 
Rodrigo, 2001). In our case our primary interest was whether the 
effect of the participant’s body posture on processing time depends 
on response modality or not.
To this end we conducted two experiments. The first experi-
ment employed a motor response to indicate the target’s location, 
conform to Michelon and Zacks’ as well as Kessler and Thomson’s 
procedures. This ensures comparability to previously reported 
results and allows for an optimal first comparison between VPT-1 
and VPT-2 with respect to embodiment. The second experiment, 
however, employed a voice key to measure response time and to 
record verbal localizations of the target by means of the preposi-
tions of interest. This would reveal whether our previous findings 
(Kessler and Thomson, 2010) regarding the embodiment of VPT-2 
as well as our potential new findings from Experiment 1 would 
actually generalize to the language domain.
ExpErImEnt 1
The goal of this experiment was to investigate the differences 
between VPT-1 and VPT-2. Firstly, we aimed at replicating the 
difference reported by Michelon and Zacks (2006) regarding the 
dependence on angular disparity: While reaction times (RTs) 
strongly increased with angle for VPT-2, RTs for VPT-1 remained 
constant across angles. This predicted an interaction between task 
(VPT-1 vs. VPT-2) and angular disparity (60°, 110°, 160°). Secondly, 
we wanted to replicate our previous results (Kessler and Thomson, 
2010) where we found a strong body posture effect for VPT-2 (con-
gruent posture faster than incongruent) and compare this pattern 
of results to the one obtained for VPT-1 with the identical posture 
manipulation. We expected that VPT-1 would not be embodied 
in the same way as VPT-2. Hence, we also expected an interaction 
between task and body posture (congruent vs. incongruent).
Kessler (2000) based on a connectionist network model for process-
ing spatial prepositions: While a mental self-rotation (i.e., VPT-2) 
is necessary for understanding “left” and “right” from a different 
perspective, “in front” and “behind” from the same perspective are 
solved based on between-object relations that “compute” the line-
of-sight. For the latter imagine someone telling you “the bag is 
behind the tree.” For determining “behind” it is only necessary to 
draw a line between that person and the tree and the bag would be 
on the side of the tree that is occluded from the person’s view (cf. 
Figure 1). Our expectation therefore was that VPT-1 subserves “in 
front” and “behind” judgments and that VPT-1 does not rely on the 
simulation of a body movement. Hence, VPT-1 would either not be 
“embodied” at all or very differently “embodied” than VPT-2.
Accordingly, we also expected VPT-1 and VPT-2 to rely on dif-
ferent neural substrates, although we could not directly test this 
hypothesis in our behavioral experiments. VPT-2 could either be a 
form of action simulation that involves action control areas in the 
posterior frontal cortex together with body schema representations 
in the parietal lobe, or VPT-2 could be a form of action emulation, 
where the perceptive and proprioceptive outcomes of the transfor-
mation are generated without the need for a full movement simula-
tion that instantiates all the intermediate steps “to get there.” The 
distinction between emulation and simulation is rather gradual in 
this context (and “simulation” will be used throughout the docu-
ment), but in an extreme scenario emulation might not involve 
action control areas at all, while essentially relying on transforma-
tions within body schema and other proprioceptive areas. The body 
schema would be involved in any case, which is indeed supported 
by a growing number of findings where the temporo-parietal junc-
tion was identified as an essential substrate for VPT-2 (Zacks and 
Michelon, 2005; Arzy et al., 2006; Keehner et al., 2006).
In contrast, if VPT-1 solely relies on understanding spatial rela-
tions between a person and at least two objects, then the primary 
substrate of VPT-1 should be the dorsal between-object system in 
parietal cortex (e.g., Goodale and Milner, 1992; Ungerleider and 
Haxby, 1994). To our knowledge no neuroimaging data are yet 
available for VPT-1, hence, the behavioral results presented here 
will provide a first hint for whether motor simulation/emulation 
networks are a likely or unlikely neural substrate for VPT-1.
Kessler (2000) argued based on his connectionist model that 
qualitatively different processes are employed for the two dimen-
sions of projective spatial prepositions (“in front”/”behind” vs. 
“left”/”right”), and explicitly related these processes to the different 
neural substrates mentioned above (i.e., to the between-object sys-
tem and to the motor simulation/emulation systems, respectively). 
In psycholinguistics there have been suggestions to relate the use 
of “in front” and “behind” to the line-of-sight (Grabowski, 1999; 
Grabowski and Miller, 2000; Kessler, 2000), yet, to our knowledge 
no explicit link has been established so far to VPT-1 as the underly-
ing cognitive mechanism. In the model by Kessler (2000) all spatial 
dimensioning starts with the extraction of a so-called “anchor”-
direction, which is basically the line-of-sight of that perspective and 
which automatically produces the “in front” pole in relation to the 
relatum (the reference object, i.e., the tree in Figure 1). “Behind” 
requires an additional processing step for determining the oppo-
site direction to “in front.” In agreement with Grabowski (1999) 
this predicts faster production times for “in front” compared to 
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was response time (RT) of correct responses only and we employed 
individual medians for each condition and participant to reduce 
distortions by outlier RTs. Error rates are reported in Table 1.
Procedure
E-Prime® 2.0 was used for experimental control. The two tasks 
(VPT-1 vs. VPT-2) were presented in alternating miniblocks of 
24 trials each (14 miniblocks in total; initial task balanced across 
participants). Every block started with an instruction about the 
given task. For VPT-2 participants were instructed to press the 
“4” key (colored yellow) with their left index for “left” and the 
“6” key (colored blue) with their right index for “right” on the 
wireless numberpad. For VPT-1 participants were instructed to 
press the “0” key (colored green) with their left index to indicate 
“visible” and the “.” key (colored brown) with their right index to 
indicate “occluded.” We did not choose a vertical key alignment in 
the latter case in order to avoid interference or congruence effects 
between target location and key location at 160° angular dispar-
ity. For instance if one would choose the top key for “occluded” 
responses and the bottom key for “visible” responses, then the 
key alignment and the target locations could mismatch at 160° 
(the “visible” target is above the “occluded” target, cf. Figure 2). In 
essence our response key mapping corresponded to the mapping 
employed by Michelon and Zacks (2006).
Every trial started with a picture displaying the posture instruc-
tion (cf. Figure 2B). When participants had assumed the correct 
posture they pressed both response buttons to proceed. A fixation 
cross was then shown for 500 ms and was automatically replaced by 
the experimental stimulus. Participants were instructed to respond 
as quickly and as accurately as possible. Twelve practice trials were 
administered in form of a miniblock of 6 VPT-2 trials and a mini-
block of 6 VPT-1 trials.
rEsults
In our first analysis we compared the two tasks (VPT-1 vs. VPT-2) 
together with the factors “body posture” (congruent vs. incongru-
ent) and “angular disparity” (60°, 110°, 160°). We also conducted 
two separate analyses for each task, where we included the two pos-
sible responses as an additional factor: “left” vs. “right” for VPT-2 
and “visible” vs. “occluded” for VPT-1. This allowed us to test for 
asymmetries within each task. For instance all participants were 
right-handed; it could therefore be that “right”-responses that 
matErIals and mEthods
Participants
All procedures were in concordance with the declaration of Helsinki 
and approved by the local ethics committee. Participants were vol-
unteers, right-handed, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, 
were naive with respect to the purpose of the study, and received 
payment or course credit for participation. Sixteen females and 8 
males took part in Experiment 1. Mean age was 23.1 years. One 
female participant had to be excluded due to excessive response 
times in the VPT-2 task (more than 3 standard deviations away 
from the sample mean). According to her self-report she had dif-
ficulties in general to determine left and right, even from her own 
(egocentric) perspective.
Stimuli and design
We employed a VPT-2 task congruent to the one originally employed 
by Kessler and Thomson (2010) revealing the embodied nature 
of VPT-2, and we added a VPT-1 task. The stimuli are shown in 
Figure 2, where an avatar was seated at one of six possible angular 
disparities (60°, 110°, 160° clockwise and anticlockwise) around 
a table. Pictures were taken from a vertical angle of 65°. Stimuli 
were colored bitmaps with a resolution of 1024 by 768 pixels cor-
responding to the graphic card settings during the experiment. 
Viewing distance was 100 cm and a chin rest was employed to 
ensure constancy.
In the center of the stimulus-table four gray hemispheres (poten-
tial targets) were arranged around an occluder (Figure 2). On each 
trial one of the hemispheres turned red indicating its status as the 
target. Hence, from the avatar’s perspective the target on a given 
trial could be left, right (VPT-2), visible, or occluded (VPT-1). In 
this first experiment participants either pressed a key to indicate 
the target’s left/right location from the avatar’s point of view, or 
they pressed a key from another set of two to indicate whether the 
target was visible or occluded to the avatar. Due to the different 
pairs of response keys for the two tasks (VPT-1 vs. VPT-2), tasks 
were blocked into miniblocks of 24 trials each, to allow for optimal 
response preparation within each block (index fingers above the 
appropriate pair of keys).
Conform to Kessler and Thomson (2010) we also varied the 
body posture of the participants randomly across trials (Figure 2). 
The body in relation to the head/gaze direction could be turned 
clockwise or anticlockwise, hence, being either congruent or incon-
gruent with respect to the direction of the avatar’s sitting position 
(at either clockwise or anticlockwise angular disparities of 60°, 
110°, 160°). Participants moved the response device (Targus® wire-
less number keypad) together with their body, while their head 
remained on the chin rest gazing ahead. Markings on the table 
indicated exactly were to place the numberpad each way to ensure 
a constant angle of ±60° (clockwise/anticlockwise) between body 
and gaze direction across trials. We administered a total of 336 trials 
with 28 trials in each cell of the 2 × 3 × 2 design consisting of the 
factors “task” (VPT-1 or VPT-2), “angular disparity” (60°, 110°, 
or 160°; collapsed across clockwise and anticlockwise disparities), 
and “body posture” (congruent or incongruent to the clockwise or 
anticlockwise direction of the avatar’s location). In separate analyses 
for VPT-1 and VPT-2 we also included the factor “response” (visible 
vs. occluded and left vs. right, respectively). Our dependent variable 
Table 1 | Mean error rates per condition for both experiments (a value of 
1.00 would mean that one mistake was committed on average in a 
particular condition).
 60 110 160
 Cong incong Cong incong Cong incong Sum
exPeriMenT 1
VPT-1 0.87 0.70 0.91 0.57 0.78 0.39 4.22
VPT-2 0.70 0.57 0.26 0.83 0.83 1.13 4.30
exPeriMenT 2
VPT-1 0.00 0.13 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.22
VPT-2 0.00 0.17 0.30 0.26 0.39 0.35 1.48
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required a keypress with the right index were faster than “left”-
responses with the left index. With respect to VPT-1 we expected 
faster responses to visible targets than to occluded ones –due to 
fewer inter-object-relations required for processing. That is, deter-
mining visibility requires only the direct relation between the ava-
tar’s line-of-sight and the target, while determining occlusion also 
requires the occluder to be processed, involving three objects and 
their inter-relations (see Introduction).
Prior to each of these three multifactorial analyses we conducted 
Mauchly’s sphericity tests and whenever the sphericity assumption 
was violated (p < 0.05) we conducted multivariate analyses of vari-
ance (MANOVA) conform to recommendations in the literature, 
as this test does not assume sphericity (Davidson, 1972; Obrien 
and Kaiser, 1985; Vasey and Thayer, 1987). Error Rates are shown 
in Table 1 and were low and inconsistent with a general speed-
accuracy-trade-off.
Combined analysis for VPT-1 and VPT-2
Sphericity was violated, so a 2 × 3 × 2 MANOVA was employed with 
“task,” “angular disparity,” and “body posture” as factors. The analy-
sis revealed significant main effects of all three factors (p < 0.01), 
but most importantly the expected interactions between task and 
angular disparity (F(2,21) = 26.1, p < 0.00001, ηp2 0 658= . ) as well 
as between task and body posture (F(1,22) = 30.7, p < 0.00001, 
ηp2 0 583= . ) reached significance and strong effect sizes (compare 
Figure 3A). These interaction effects will be analyzed further 
in relation to each task separately in the next two sub-sections 
(Analysis for VPT-2 and Analysis for VPT-1).
Analysis for VPT-2
Sphericity was violated, so we employed a 3 × 2 × 2 MANOVA 
with the factors “angular disparity,” “body posture,” and “response” 
(left vs. right). The analysis revealed significant main effects of 
angle (F(2,21) = 25.6, p < 0.00001, ηp2 0 661= . ) and of body posture 
(F(1,22) = 33.4, p < 0.00001, ηp2 0 603= . ). Although all participants 
were right-handed we did not find significantly faster responses 
with the right index (p = 0.62). Somewhat in contrast to our previ-
ous results (Kessler and Thomson, 2010) we did not find a signifi-
cant interaction between angle and body posture either (p = 0.72). 
As can be seen in Figure 3A (right graph) this is due a strong body 
posture effect at all angular disparities, even at the lowest of 60° 
(Newman–Keuls test p = 0.0003).
Analysis for VPT-1
Sphericity was not violated, so we employed a 3 × 2 × 2 ANOVA 
with the factors “angular disparity,” “body posture,” and “response” 
(visible vs. occluded). The only significant model term was the 
main effect of response (F(1,22) = 7.1, p = 0.014, ηp2 0 245= . ), with 
“visible” being consistently faster than “occluded” judgments as 
shown in Figure 4 (left graph) and conform to our predictions 
(Grabowski, 1999; Kessler, 2000; see Introduction).
Discussion of ExpErimEnt 1
We expected VPT-1 and VPT-2 to be qualitatively different processes, 
and we expected this to be reflected by distinct response patterns in 
relation to angular disparities as well as in relation to body posture. 
This was confirmed by the two significant  interactions (task × angle; 
Figure 3 | results for experiment 1 and 2 in the combined analysis. Group 
mean response times (RT) for (A) Experiment 1 and (B) Experiment 2. Vertical 
bars denote the standard error of mean. Further explanations in the text.
task × body posture) in the combined analysis. Furthermore we did 
not find an asymmetry between spatially mapped left and right 
motor responses (VPT-2) while we did find that responses to visible 
targets were faster than to occluded targets (VPT-1). We replicated 
Michelon and Zacks’ (2006) findings showing that response times 
for VPT-2 increased with angular disparity, whereas response times 
for VPT-1 were not affected by angular disparity and remained 
constant. Interestingly, we found faster responses for visible than 
for occluded targets conform to our hypothesis which was extrapo-
lated from asymmetries reported for “in front”/”behind” judgments 
(Herrmann et al., 1987; Bryant et al., 1992). We are not aware of any 
previous reports of such a finding regarding visibility judgments. 
This finding is a first hint that VPT-1 might indeed subserve “in 
front” and ”behind” localizations.
We have also replicated and extended our previous VPT-2 findings 
(Kessler and Thomson, 2010) regarding the effect of the participants’ 
body posture by observing significantly faster RTs with a congruent 
than an incongruent posture at all angular disparities, even at 60°. 
We have confirmed that VPT-2 is embodied, in  concordance with 
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well as with a recording of what had been said on a given trial. The 
voice onset threshold was tuned for each participant individually 
and we verified/adjusted the voice onset time on every single trial 
before proceeding with the analysis. Specifically, the recordings 
enabled us to determine for each response whether it had been 
correct and whether the voice key had been indeed triggered by the 
onset of the verbal response and not by any other acoustic event 
(e.g., smacking of lips) or if the voice onset had been missed by the 
voice key. If the automatic voice onset detection had been incorrect 
we re-measured the voice onset time with audio editing software 
(Music Editor v8.2.5). This verification procedure was essential as 
the initial phonemes varied across the four prepositions. To further 
validate our procedure for extracting the response times (RTs) we 
sampled 184 response audio files (46 files per preposition, 2 from 
each participant) from the total pool of responses and asked 8 
independent Raters to determine the voice onset times in each 
of these 184 response files. For each Rater the difference between 
their RT for a given file and our manually adjusted voice key RT 
was calculated. We then calculated average differences for each 
preposition to see whether there was a specific bias in our data 
that could have affected the outcomes (e.g., “right” being system-
atically delayed compared to “left”). The average differences for 
each preposition were as follows (with minimum and maximum 
across Raters in brackets): behind = −4.79 ms (min. = −12.22; 
max. = 15.48), in front = −1.78 ms (min. = −12.39; max. = 15.78), 
left = −5.68 ms (min. = −14.35; max. = 15.26), right = −2.68 ms 
(min. = −11.07; max. = 22.83). None of the Raters revealed specific 
distortions for a particular preposition. This validation reveals 
that our procedure worked well, but also, that it was not possible 
to determine the voice onset with millisecond accuracy, which 
we have to take into consideration when interpreting our results. 
Most importantly for the interpretation of our data, no bias was 
observed for the RTs of a particular preposition to be systematically 
over- or underestimated in relation to the others to an extent that 
could explain our effects.
Error rates were particularly low in this Experiment (see Table 1). 
We analyzed RTs only for the correct responses and we employed 
individual medians for each condition to reduce distortions by 
outlier RTs. The two tasks (“in front”/”behind” vs. “left”/”right”) 
were presented again in alternating miniblocks of 24 trials each 
for maximum comparability to Experiment 1. At the beginning 
of each miniblock participants were instructed about the two 
verbal alternatives they were expected to use: “left”/“right” or “in 
front”/“behind.” Again two miniblocks of 6 trials each were admin-
istered for practising VPT-2 and VPT-1, respectively, before the 336 
experimental trials were presented.
rEsults
As for Experiment 1 we conducted three analyses. In the first we 
compared the two tasks (“in front”/”behind” vs. “left”/”right”) 
together with the factors “body posture” (congruent vs. incongru-
ent) and “angular disparity” (60°, 110°, 160°). We then conducted 
two separate analyses for each task, where we included the two 
possible responses as an additional factor: “left” vs. “right” and “in 
front” vs. “behind,” respectively. This allowed us to test for asym-
metries between the poles of each dimension separately. Error Rates 
were particularly low and are shown in Table 1.
our previous conclusion that it is the endogenous simulation of a 
body rotation (Kessler and Thomson, 2010). The novel finding in 
Experiment 1 was that VPT-1 was not affected by body posture and 
was therefore not at all embodied, or very differently than VPT-2. In 
Experiment 2 we set out to generalize these findings and conclusions 
to the language domain for establishing a direct link between the 
two levels of VPT and the two horizontal dimensions of projective 
prepositions (“in front”/”behind” vs. “left”/”right”).
ExpErImEnt 2
matErIals and mEthods
Participants
Fifteen female and 9 male volunteers, English native speakers, right-
handed, with normal or corrected-to-normal vision, who were 
naive with respect to the purpose of the study, and who received 
payment or course credit took part in Experiment 2. Mean age was 
22.3 years. One female participant had to be excluded from data 
analysis due to excessively slow response times. After the experi-
ment the participant disclosed that she was diagnosed with a “slow 
processing” expression of dyslexia.
Stimuli, design, and procedure
Exactly the same stimuli and design were employed as in Experiment 
1. Also the procedure was largely the same with the posture instruc-
tion at the beginning of each trial (cf. Figure 2), the 500 ms fixa-
tion cross, and the subsequent presentation of the experimental 
stimulus (cf. Figure 2). The main and essential difference was 
that we used a voice key (Logitech® headset in combination with 
DMDX software version 4 http://www.u.arizona.edu/∼kforster/
dmdx/dmdx.htm) that provided us with voice onset times (RTs) as 
Figure 4 | results for experiment 1 and 2 in the level 1 analysis. Group 
mean response times (RT) for visible vs. occluded judgments with key 
presses in Experiment 1 (left graph) and for “in front” vs. “behind” judgments 
with verbal responses in Experiment 2 (right graph). Vertical bars denote the 
standard error of mean. Further explanations in the text.
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160° where targets that are “behind” are closer to the observer than 
targets that are “in front.” This seems to suggest that the observer’s 
fixed viewpoint plays a role in determining the inter-object rela-
tionships that lead to “in front”/”behind” judgments. This further 
underpins the qualitative difference to “left”/”right” judgments, 
where the observer’s viewpoint is mentally shifted.
In concordance with Experiment 1 body posture did not modu-
late RTs for “in front”/”behind” judgments. In total we observed 
a strikingly similar pattern between “in front”/”behind” and vis-
ible/occluded judgments (Figure 3 left column, Figure 4), which 
conforms to our prediction that VPT-1 subserves both types of 
judgments and is independent of response modality.
Verbal “left”/”right” judgments were significantly influenced by 
angular disparity conform to Experiment 1, our previous findings 
(Kessler and Thomson, 2010) and to reports by others (Kozhevnikov 
and Hegarty, 2001; Hegarty and Waller, 2004; Zacks and Michelon, 
2005; Kozhevnikov et al., 2006). Most importantly, this task was also 
strongly affected by body posture. The pattern here also revealed a 
significant interaction between angle and posture conform to our 
previous findings (Kessler and Thomson, 2010).
We conclude that we accomplished our goal to generalize the 
data pattern obtained for the two VPT tasks with key presses (motor 
response) in Experiment 1 to verbal responses using spatial prepo-
sitions in Experiment 2. However, if one visually compares the 
RT patterns across Experiments (Figure 3) then it seems that RTs 
for VPT-2 (“left”/”right”) are generally increased in Experiment 2 
compared to Experiment 1 (Figures 3A,B, right graphs). In order 
to statistically substantiate this observation we conducted a direct 
comparison between the two Experiments.
Combined analysis
Sphericity was violated, so we employed a 2 × 3 × 2 MANOVA 
with “task,” “angular disparity,” and “body posture” as factors. As 
in Experiment 1 the analysis revealed significant main effects of all 
three factors (p < 0.01), and the expected interactions between task 
and angular disparity (F(2,21) = 18.1, p < 0.0001, ηp2 0 595= . ) as 
well as between task and body posture (F(1,22) = 21.33, p < 0.001, 
ηp2 0 492= . ). In contrast to Experiment 1 also the three-way inter-
action between task, angular disparity, and body posture reached 
significance (F(1,21) = 5.9, p < 0.01, ηp2 0 197= . ). The latter was 
mainly due to a gradually increasing posture effect with angular 
disparity for “left”/”right”: The body posture effect reached signifi-
cance at 160° and 110° (Newman–Keuls test p < 0.001) but not quite 
at 60° (p = 0.07). “In front”/”behind,” on the other hand, revealed a 
strikingly similar pattern to Experiment 1 with no RT increase with 
angular disparity and no posture effect (Figure 3, left graphs). The 
interaction effects will be analyzed further in relation to each task 
separately in the next two sub-sections (Analysis for “Left”/”Right” 
and Analysis for “in Front”/”Behind”).
Analysis for “left”/”right”
Sphericity was violated, so we employed a 3 × 2 × 2 MANOVA 
with the factors “angular disparity,” “body posture,” and “response” 
(“left” vs. “right”). The analysis revealed significant main effects of 
angle (F(2,21) = 22.1, p < 0.0001, ηp2 0 619= . ) and of body posture 
(F(1,22) = 19.1, p < 0.001, ηp2 0 498= . ). Conform to Experiment 1 
we did not observe significantly faster responses for either “left” or 
“right” responses (p = 0.14). However, in Experiment 2 RTs were 
determined based on vocal responses and although our procedures 
for determining voice onsets worked well on average (see Stimuli, 
Design, and Procedure), increased variability could have masked 
a true difference between left and right.
Analysis for “in front”/”behind”
Sphericity was not violated, so we employed a 3 × 2 × 2 ANOVA with 
the factors “angular disparity,” “body posture,” and “response” (“in 
front” vs. “behind”). The main effect of response reached signifi-
cance (F(1,22) = 16.7, p < 0.001, ηp2 0 432= . ), as shown in Figure 4, 
right part of the graph. The interaction between response and angle 
also reached significance (F(1,22) = 3.5, p < 0.05, ηp2 0 137= . ) sug-
gesting that the difference between “in front” and “behind” judg-
ments was consistent but decreased across angular disparities (see 
Figure 5). “In front” judgments were overall faster than “behind” 
judgments conform to the findings in Experiment 1 for VPT-1 by 
means of key presses, with “visible” being faster than “occluded” 
judgments (Figure 4, left graph).
dIscussIon of ExpErImEnt 2
RTs for “in front” were consistently faster than for “behind” which 
corresponded to the asymmetry between “visible” and “occluded” 
responses in Experiment 1. Angular disparity also had an effect in 
form of an interaction but very differently compared to the VPT-2 
tasks in both Experiments. Here RTs for “behind” decreased with 
angle while RTs for “in front” increased. This may be explained 
by taking into consideration that at 60° targets that are “in front” 
from the avatar’s perspective are also closer to the observer than 
targets that are “behind,” which are further away. This is reversed at 
Figure 5 | results experiment 2 in the level 1 analysis. Group mean 
response times (RT) for “in front” vs. “behind” judgments in Experiment 2 at 
each angular disparity, which reflects the significant interaction between 
angular disparity and preposition. Vertical bars denote the standard error of 
mean. Further explanations in the text.
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of “ experiment” reached significance (F(1,44) = 20, p < 0.0001, 
ηp2 0 313= . ) suggesting that error rates were lower with verbal 
responses (cf. Table 1).
Overall the comparison between Experiments further cor-
roborated our conclusion that VPT-1 and VPT-2 were employed 
independently of response modality, yet, in addition we found an 
asymmetry between VPT-1 and VPT-2 across modalities that indi-
cates that overall RTs are more strongly increased for VPT-2 than for 
VPT-1, when responses were made verbally (Figure 6). Error rate 
differences only reflected a main effect of experiment with verbal 
responses being more accurate, so the observed interaction with 
RTs is not likely to reflect a general speed-accuracy-trade-off.
General Discussion
We found revealing commonalities and differences across the two 
experiments. Disregarding response modality (motor vs. verbal), 
within each experiment we found a qualitatively distinct pattern 
between the two tasks, while the pattern was remarkably similar 
for each task across the two experiments (i.e., modalities). It is 
important to emphasize that these results confirm our hypoth-
esis that the distinct patterns we observed for VPT-1 and VPT-2 
regarding angular disparity and embodiment do not depend on 
response modality, which contrasts with some findings reported in 
the context of spatial updating (de Vega and Rodrigo, 2001). In the 
following we discuss the implications of our results in detail.
VPT-1 anD “in fronT”/”behinD”
One of our most striking results was that the response time pat-
terns for visible/occluded and for “in front”/”behind” judgments 
were almost identical (cf. Figure 3, left column, Figure 4), con-
sidering that different individuals participated in the two experi-
ments, that the task instructions differed (visibility vs. spatial 
location judgments), and that different response modalities were 
employed. The most prominent features in common were the 
absence of an increasing cost across angular disparities as well as 
the absence of an embodiment effect, i.e., of the participants’ body 
posture (congruent vs. incongruent). These strong similarities 
support our hypothesis that identical processes subserve the two 
types of judgments, yet, our final piece of evidence is also the most 
convincing: In both experiments those trials, where the target 
was located closer to the avatar than the occluder, i.e., requir-
ing “visible” or “in front” responses, respectively, were processed 
consistently faster than trials where the occluder was between 
the avatar and the target, i.e, in “occluded” or “behind” trials. 
In total we believe that this provides conclusive evidence that in 
scenarios where the spatial prepositions “in front” and “behind” 
have to be determined from the perspective of another person, 
level 1 perspective taking (VPT-1) is the employed cognitive proc-
ess. Accordingly, our findings close a gap between cognitive and 
developmental psychology on the one hand and psycholinguistics 
on the other.
VPT-2 anD “lefT”/”riGhT”
With respect to VPT-2 we were able to replicate the embodiment 
effect in form of posture congruence effect with verbal responses, 
which we had previously observed with motor responses. This con-
firms that VPT-2 suberves “left”/”right” judgments (e.g., Michelon 
comParison beTween exPerimenT 1 anD 2
We compared the two Experiments by means of a MANOVA 
(Sphericity was violated) employing the within subjects factors 
“task,” “angular disparity,” “body posture” and the between factor 
“experiment.” The results reflected the experiment-specific findings 
with overall significant effects of angular disparity (F(2,43) = 46.3, 
p < 0.00001, ηp2 0 635= . ), body posture (F(1,44) = 25.8, p < 0.00001, 
ηp2 0 369= . ), task × angle (F(2,43) = 44.8, p < 0.00001, ηp2 0 626= . ), 
task × posture (F(1,44) = 51.7, p < 0.00001, ηp2 0 540= . ), and 
task × angle × posture (F(2,43) = 4.5, p < 0.02, ηp2 0 072= . ). The 
major difference between the two experiments was reflected in a 
significant interaction between task and experiment (F(1,44) = 4.9, 
p < 0.05, ηp2 0 101= . ) shown in Figure 6. The interaction was due to 
a larger difference in overall response times for VPT-2 between the 
two Experiments (Experiment 2 slower than Experiment 1) than 
for VPT-1.
We also compared each task (VPT-1 and VPT-2) sepa-
rately between the two Experiments but did not find any sig-
nificant effect of “experiment.” It is, however, noteworthy that 
in the VPT-1 analysis the interaction between response (“in 
front” + “visible” vs. “behind” + “occluded”) and angular dispar-
ity reached significance across both experiments (F(2,88) = 6.2, 
p < 0.01, ηp2 0 124= . ), suggesting that the corresponding interac-
tion reported for Experiment 2 (see Figure 5) might generalize 
across modalities.
We compared Error Rates (ER) between the two Experiments 
and the two tasks in a 2 × 2 ANOVA with “task” as within and 
“experiment” as between subjects factors (as shown in Table 1, 
some conditions in Experiment 2 did not reveal any variance at 
all, so the full design could not be employed). The main effect 
Figure 6 | Comparing the two experiments. Group mean response times 
(RT) for VPT-1 vs. VPT-2 and for each Experiment (1 vs. 2) reflecting the 
significant interaction between “experiment” and “task”. Vertical bars denote 
the standard error of mean. Further explanations in the text.
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Implications for the neural substrates of VPT-1 and VPT-2
We propose the following hypotheses regarding the neural substrates 
of VPT-1 and VPT-2, which seem most compatible with the cur-
rently available data. VPT-2 is either a form of action simulation 
that essentially involves action control areas in the posterior frontal 
cortex together with body schema representations in the parietal 
lobe and possibly vestibular information represented in the Insula, 
or VPT-2 is a form of action emulation, where the perceptive and 
proprioceptive outcomes of the transformation are generated with-
out the need for a full movement simulation that contains all the 
intermediate steps “to get there.” Although this distinction is rather 
gradual in our case an emulation process during VPT-2 might not 
require action control areas to be involved, while essentially relying 
on the emulation of representations in body schema and other pro-
prioceptive areas (e.g., vestibular representations in the Insula).
Parietal areas and in particular the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) 
indeed seem to be a prominent part of the physiological substrate of 
VPT-2 (Zacks and Michelon, 2005; Arzy et al., 2006; Keehner et al., 
2006). For example Arzy et al. (2006) and Blanke et al. (2005) reported 
that the TPJ was related to disembodied processing (the self was imag-
ined outside the body) and Samson et al. (2005) reported difficulties 
with VPT-2 after lesions in this area. Recent ERP mapping results 
corroborated the importance of the TPJ and further implicated pos-
terior frontal areas (Schwabe et al., 2009). Zacks and Michelon (2005) 
also concluded that VPT-2 recruits posterior frontal areas that code 
for body movements but Wraga et al. (2005) questioned the involve-
ment of full action simulation in VPT-2 compared to mental object 
rotation. Hence, for VPT-2 strong evidence exists in support of the 
temporo-parietal junction being part of the neural substrate, while 
posterior frontal and vestibular/insular (e.g., Blanke and Thut, 2007; 
Grabherr et al., 2007) contributions are still being debated.
To our knowledge no conclusive neuroimaging results exist for 
VPT-1, but in the light of our results simulation/emulation net-
works are an unlikely neural substrate. We predict that the dorsal 
between-objects pathway in parietal cortex would be the main 
processing substrate together with the ventral object/person recog-
nition system in the temporal lobe (e.g., Goodale and Milner, 1992; 
Ungerleider and Haxby, 1994), but would not require additional 
processing input from action control or proprioceptive areas.
Implications for evolution and development
The qualitative distinction between VPT-1 and VPT-2 we observed 
in our data is reflected in onto- and phylogenetic differences. As we 
described in the Introduction, VPT-1 develops around the age of 
2 years and autistic children do not seem to experience particular 
difficulties with this task (Leslie and Frith, 1988; Baron-Cohen, 1989). 
VPT-2 tends to develop around 4–5 years (Gzesh and Surber, 1985; 
Hamilton et al., 2009), but not in children diagnosed with autism spec-
trum disorder (ASD) (Hamilton et al., 2009). Primates seem capable 
of certain forms of VPT-1 but not at all of VPT-2 (Tomasello et al., 
2005). This suggests that VPT-2 is the more advanced cognitive proc-
ess, which is consistent with our RT results where VPT-2 was slower, 
and hence, the more demanding cognitive process than VPT-1.
We concluded (see VPT-1 vs. VPT-2, Implications for the Neural 
Substrates of VPT-1 and VPT-2) that VPT-2 is the endogenous (self-
initiated) emulation or simulation of a body rotation into another 
perspective, while VPT-1 does not seem to rely on such a simulation 
and Zacks, 2006) and that disregarding response modality the 
default strategy consists of mentally simulating a body rotation 
(cf. Kessler and Thomson, 2010).
However, Figure 6 also shows a systematic difference between 
Experiments 1 and 2. With verbal “left”/”right” responses VPT-2 
take longer, i.e., RTs seem to be shifted up by more than 100 ms. 
It is puzzling that verbal “left”/”right” judgments come at such an 
increased cost compared to motor responses. “In front”/”behind” 
judgments do not seem to suffer such a cost compared to visibility 
judgments (visible/occluded). Also, a general speed-accuracy-trade-
off does not seem to account for the particularly elevated costs of 
VPT-2 with a verbal response (see Comparison Between Experiment 
1 and 2). We propose that for “left”/”right” judgments language 
processes, e.g., in form of lexical access, take longer compared to 
“in front”/”behind,” possibly due to their larger ambiguity (e.g., 
Coventry and Garrod, 2004; e.g., Levelt, 1996; Grabowski, 1999). 
This ambiguity is reflected in larger RTs for verbal “left”/”right” 
responses even at low angular disparities (compare Figure 3B, right 
graph), and possibly even at 0° angular disparity as Grabowski 
(1999) suggested.
Vpt-1 Vs. Vpt-2
We have replicated Michelon and Zacks’ (2006) findings that 
VPT-1 and VPT-2 reveal qualitatively different response time pat-
terns in relation to increasing angular disparity: While VPT-1 was 
not affected in any significant way, VPT-2 showed a significant 
increase in response time with increasing angular disparity. Our 
results in total corroborate the notion that the two types of perspec-
tive taking are based on two qualitatively different processes. While 
we replicated our previous findings (Kessler and Thomson, 2010) 
showing that VPT-2 strongly depends on the congruence of the 
participants’ body posture with the direction in which the avatar is 
seated, we showed for the first time that no such pattern is observed 
for VPT-1. We conclude in concordance with Kessler and Thomson 
(2010) that VPT-2 is the endogenous (self-initiated) emulation or 
simulation of a body rotation into another perspective.
In contrast, VPT-1 seems to involve a process that determines 
object locations in relation to the line-of-sight of another person 
(Michelon and Zacks, 2006). This could be regarded as some sort 
of embodied representation in its own right: Gaze is a very strong 
social cue that has been related to processes of motor resonance (for 
a review Frischen et al., 2007). Perceiving someone’s gaze is proc-
essed in a brain network that overlaps with gaze control (Grosbras 
et al., 2005). This would support the notion of embodiment of 
VPT-1 in the form of motor resonance, which, however, does not 
rely on deliberate movement simulation like VPT-2 (see Kessler 
and Thomson, 2010, Experiment 4 for details of this distinction). 
Michelon and Zacks (2006, Experiment 3) investigated VPT-1 in 
the absence of an avatar, that is, without an external “gaze”-anchor 
for establishing the line-of-sight. Humans can easily imagine a vir-
tual line-of-sight and solve the task. The interesting question is 
whether such a process would be implemented in part by cortical 
gaze control areas. This could possibly extent the notion of embodi-
ment of VPT-1 toward deliberate simulation in gaze coding areas. 
However, based on our current findings we conclude that even if 
VPT-1 involves gaze simulation, this form of simulation is very 
different from movement simulation during VPT-2.
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the situational input to the VPT processes. These transform the input 
into an abstract cognitive representation that is a direct outcome of 
the situational constraints and, hence, grounded in the situation.
However, based on our results we propose that for determining 
the situationally grounded meaning of projective spatial prepositions, 
“left” and “right” involve an effortful, embodied process of movement 
simulation that is equivalent to VPT-2, while “in front” and “behind” 
are determined quite effortlessly based on the generation of a “line-
of-sight” and the resulting spatial relations; equivalent to VPT-1. 
Grabowski (1999) suggested an anthropomorphological definition 
of the semantics of these four spatial prepositions proposing that the 
human line-of-sight would determine the “front” and as a result the 
“behind” from a given perspective1. This is in full agreement with 
the notion we propose here (also Kessler, 2000), namely that both 
spatial dimensions and the related four prepositions are not only 
grounded in the situational constraints but are also related to the 
human perceptual apparatus and body. According to this notion 
front/behind are related to asymmetries of the human body (eyes 
define the front), while left/right relate to the symmetrical sides of 
our bodies. As a consequence the front of any other perspective can 
be easily determined or imagined, which automatically provides a 
line-of-sight and the “front” pole within the visible area in relation to 
a relatum (in the experiments presented here this was the occluder in 
the middle of the table, and in Figure 1 it is the tree). Next, “behind” 
can be directly determined as the opposite pole, which is occluded 
from the view of the target perspective. Hence, the first horizontal 
dimension can be easily determined based on features and inter-
object relations within the presented scene resulting in a grounded 
and situated “meaning” of the respective prepositions. Furthermore, 
our results suggest that this process is identical to VPT-1.
Due to the symmetry of our bodies “left” and “right” cannot be 
determined based on visual features, but have to be determined with 
more effort, namely, by means of a perspective transformation into the 
target perspective. Our results have confirmed that this transforma-
tion process is identical to level 2 perspective taking (VPT-2), which 
we now know is the simulation or emulation of a body rotation.
In terms of embodiment and grounding we propose that “in 
front”/”behind” are essentially grounded in relation to the visible 
features of the human body but that the extent to which embodi-
ment – in a more powerful sense, conform to Wilson’s sixth meaning 
of embodied cognition (2002) – is still part of the ongoing process-
ing (e.g., simulation within gaze control areas) is an open empirical 
question as pointed out in a previous section (VPT-1 vs. VPT-2). 
“Left”/”right,” in contrast, essentially rely on movement simulation/
emulation when determined from a perspective that is misaligned 
with the egocentric viewpoint. These distinctions between embod-
ied, grounded, and situated processing are in concordance with 
Myachykov et al.’s (2009) notion proposed in the context of number 
representations. Our care in distinguishing the “when,” “how much,” 
and “in what way” of embodiment of VPT-1 and VPT-2 and in find-
ing different answers for the two forms of perspective taking is further 
in agreement with Chatterjee’s (2010) recent call for more rigorous 
distinctions when claiming embodiment of cognitive processes.
process. Instead VPT-1 seems to involve a process that determines 
object locations in relation to the line-of-sight of another person. 
Although movement simulation seems like a simple operation at first 
glance, it minimally requires the awareness of two pieces of informa-
tion. Firstly, the knowledge that someone else may have a very different 
view of the world which requires some form of alignment before it 
can be fully understood, and that, secondly, one does not always have 
to physically change one’s location in order to achieve such an align-
ment; instead, one can simply imagine it. While we seem to share the 
first step with apes who change their location to align themselves with 
humans or conspecifics (Tomasello et al., 1998; Brauer et al., 2005), 
the second stage seems to be uniquely human. The closer one looks 
the more impressive this latter achievement actually becomes: we use a 
skill that evolved millions of years ago, i.e., moving, decouple the actual 
execution of the movement from its planning, control, and sensory 
transformation and employ the abstract movement representation 
for a mental simulation of the representational consequences.
According to these considerations VPT-2 should develop after 
certain forms of mental simulation have been mastered by a given 
individual, specifically the skill and the awareness that one can 
actually imagine oneself deliberately in another location, i.e., 
outside our own body. The next step would be to employ such a 
mental operation to imagine someone else’s perspective. This can 
be regarded as a prototype of theory of mind (ToM) where an 
individual infers the mental states of another person. In support 
of this claim Hamilton et al. (2009) found that only ToM score, but 
not verbal skills or mental object rotation performance, predicted 
VPT-2 ability in typically developing and in children diagnosed 
with autism. While mental object rotation performance was not 
impaired in the autism group, they had significantly lower ToM 
scores and were significantly impaired on the VPT-2 task.
So what might go wrong in autism? Can autistic individuals 
mentally simulate movements without actually executing them? 
Can they imagine themselves outside their bodies? If the answers 
are yes, is the transfer of this skill onto inferring someone else’s 
mental states amiss or hampered? To our knowledge there is no 
report of adults diagnosed with autism that describes their ability 
or disability to conduct VPT-2 and the particular strategies they 
employ in case they have mastered this ability at some point of 
their individual development. A posture change like the one we 
employed here could reveal if autistic participants use movement 
simulation for VPT-2 in the same way as typical participants, or 
whether they have learned to employ a mental object rotation (OR) 
strategy instead, since OR does not seem to impose any difficulties 
for them (e.g., Hamilton et al., 2009). Kessler and Thomson (2010) 
showed that with typical participants VPT-2 as well as OR increased 
with angular disparity, yet, that the posture manipulation allowed 
for a qualitative distinction between VPT-2 and OR.
ImplIcatIons for spatIal lanGuaGE: GroundEd, sItuatEd, and 
EmbodIEd procEssInG
Both processes of perspective taking result in higher-level cogni-
tive representations about other people’s views of the world that are 
strongly grounded in the context of the specific situation (cf. Harnad, 
1990; Barsalou, 2008; Myachykov et al., 2009). Specifically, the location 
and orientation of the avatar and the location of the target in relation 
to the avatar as well as to the occluder (or  relatum in general) provide 
1Grabowski suggests several important distinctions, e.g., “inside perspective” vs. 
“outside perspective” Here we simply focus on the main aspect of this notion, 
 namely the relation to the human body as an anchor for spatial dimensioning.
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and then all relative dimensions of space (i.e., “left”/”right” AND 
“in front”/”behind”) are determined based on this particular FOR, 
thus, implying that the identical cognitive transformation into 
that FOR (i.e., “origo projection,” Grabowski, 1999; Grabowski 
and Miller, 2000) underlies all dimensional relations (i.e., “in 
front”/“behind” AND “left”/“right”). In contrast, we have con-
firmed the hypothesis of Kessler (2000) that two qualitatively 
different cognitive processes (VPT-1 vs. VPT-2) are involved. 
Accordingly, we predict that different FORs may be chosen for the 
two horizontal dimensions (“in front”/”behind” vs. “left”/”right”) 
in situations, where the two underlying processes (VPT-1 and 
VPT-2, respectively) significantly differ in terms of cognitive effort. 
In essence we propose a dissociation between semantic concep-
tions of spatial prepositions and the psychology of their situated, 
grounded, and embodied use.
conclusIons
Based on our findings we draw the following three major con-
clusions. Firstly, level 1 (VPT-1) and level 2 (VPT-2) perspective 
taking are qualitatively different cognitive processes, especially 
with respect to embodiment. VPT-2 is the mental simulation of a 
body movement where the effort increases with mental distance 
to cover (angular disparity effect) and with the level of body pos-
ture incongruence. VPT-1 relies on determining visibility of the 
target by imagining the line-of-sight from a given perspective. 
This process does not depend on mental distance (no angular 
disparity effect) or on movement simulation (no body posture 
effect). The finding that visibility is faster to judge than occlusion 
further supports the assumed process. VPT-2 is the more effort-
ful and, hence, the more sophisticated cognitive process, which 
is consistent with the available developmental, comparative, and 
neuroimaging data.
Secondly, both VPT processes are applied in their essential form 
with key presses as well as with verbal responses in form of preposi-
tions. We therefore conclude that VPT-1 is the cognitive process 
that subserves verbal localizations using “in front” and “behind” 
from a perspective other than the egocentric and that VPT-2 is the 
cognitive process that subserves verbal localizations using “left” 
and “right” from a perspective other than the egocentric. In the 
latter case, however, verbal responses come at an additional cost 
compared to key presses, which might reflect higher ambiguity. 
Both VPT processes result in a grounded and situated “meaning” 
of the prepositions they subserve, but only VPT-2 is embodied in 
the form of movement simulation.
Thirdly, the difference in cognitive effort associated with VPT-2 
compared to VPT-1 implies that in specific situations language 
users will prefer a different, less “effortful,” frame of reference for 
“left”/”right” than for “in front”/”behind.” This prediction is at 
odds with the assumption of a single and general “origo projection” 
process for the psychological use of spatial prepositions.
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Cognitive effort: implications for selecting a frame of reference
In congruence with the considerations in the previous section 
(Implications for Spatial Language: Grounded, Situated, and 
Embodied Processing), Kessler (2000) devised a model for the 
interpretation of spatial prepositions in complex situations with 
up to three competing frames of reference (FOR). For each FOR 
(or potential perspective) a basic direction, so-called “anchor” 
direction, is extracted based on the visual features of that per-
spective (e.g., face of another person or front of an intrinsically 
directed object like a car; see Grabowski, 1999 and Levelt, 1996, 
for discussions). This anchor direction is equivalent to “in front” 
(i.e., visible) while “behind” (i.e., occluded) requires a single addi-
tional step in the opposite direction. This prioritization of the 
front pole predicts an advantage in speed over the opposite pole, 
which is exactly what we found disregarding response modality 
(i.e., “visible” and “in front” are processed faster than “occluded” 
and “behind”). Furthermore such an “anchor” direction can then 
be employed to determine the left and right poles in the orthogo-
nal direction: the egocentric gaze direction (egocentric anchor) 
is rotated into the target anchor and the egocentric left and right 
are mapped onto the target left and right of that perspective. This 
is essentially a model of perspective transformation and Kessler 
(2000, pp. 135, 208–210) pointed out the similarity between the 
model features and a gradual transformation of a body representa-
tion for action control. Our recent findings (Kessler and Thomson, 
2010) and the results presented here support this hypothesis.
Hence, while the situated meaning of all four projective prep-
ositions is strongly grounded within the spatial configuration 
of the situation, only localizations employing “left” or “right” 
necessitate a movement simulation. While one could point out 
that a line-of-sight could also be regarded as an embodied basis 
that subserves VPT-1 (see VPT-1 vs. VPT-2), our findings reveal 
that only the movement simulation for VPT-2 comes at a cost 
that increases with disparity, i.e., the distance of the simulated 
movement, and is modulated by the congruence of propriocep-
tive information (i.e., body posture). Such a qualitative distinc-
tion especially in terms of cognitive effort would have strong 
implications for the use of spatial prepositions in specific situ-
ations, assuming that cognitive systems tend to minimize their 
effort. While there is no increased effort involved in determining 
“in front” or “behind” from the perspective of someone sitting 
opposite to ourselves, it implies a mental self-rotation effort to 
adopt this person’s perspective for “left” or “right.” Therefore 
we might willingly adopt the frame of reference (FOR) of the 
other person for the use of “in front” and “behind” while we 
might be reluctant to do the same for “left” and “right” due to 
the involved cognitive effort (Kessler, 2000). Additional factors 
within the situational context play a role in our “willingness” to 
take on the effort or not, as has been shown for socio-emotional 
factors (Graf, 1994; Levelt, 1996; Grabowski and Miller, 2000; 
Kessler, 2000; Coventry and Garrod, 2004), but also for more 
implicit influences such as an action-related topic of the situa-
tion (Tversky and Hard, 2009).
In contrast, even the most situated and grounded psycholinguis-
tic accounts (e.g., Grabowski, 1999; Grabowski and Miller, 2000) 
still implicitly assume that first and foremost a frame of reference 
(FOR) is chosen (e.g., egocentric, partner-centered, or intrinsic), 
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognition  December 2010 | Volume 1 | Article 213 | 12
Kessler and Rutherford Perspective-taking, embodiment and spatial prepositions
for  perception and action. Trends 
Neurosci. 15, 20–25.
Grabherr, L., Karmali, F., Bach, S., 
Indermaur, K., Metzler, S., and Mast, 
F. W. (2007). Mental own-body and 
body-part transformations in micro-
gravity. J. Vestib. Res. 17, 279–287.
Grabowski, J. (1999). A uniform anthropo-
morphological approach to the human 
conception of dimensional relations. 
Spat. Cogn. Comput. 1, 349–363.
Grabowski, J., and Miller, G. A. (2000). 
Factors affecting the use of dimen-
sional prepositions in German and 
American English: object orienta-
tion, social context, and preposi-
tional pattern. J. Psycholinguist. Res. 
29, 517–553.
Graf, R. (1994). Selbstrotation und 
Raumreferenz: Zur Psychologie partner-
bezogenen Lokalisierens (Self-rotation 
and Spatial Reference: The Psychology 
of Partner-Centred Localisations). 
Frankfurt: Peter Lang.
Grosbras, M. N., Laird, A. R., and Paus, 
T. (2005). Cortical regions involved 
in eye movements, shifts of attention, 
and gaze perception. Hum. Brain 
Mapp. 25, 140–154.
Gzesh, S. M., and Surber, C. F. (1985). 
Visual perspective-taking skills in 
children. Child Dev. 56, 1204–1213.
Hamilton, A. F. D., Brindley, R., and 
Frith, U. (2009). Visual perspective 
taking impairment in children with 
autistic spectrum disorder. Cognition 
113, 37–44.
Harnad, S. (1990). The symbol grounding 
problem. Physica D 42, 335–346.
Hegarty, M., and Waller, D. (2004). A 
dissociation between mental rotation 
and perspective-taking spatial abilities. 
Intelligence 32, 175–191.
Herrmann, T., Bürkle, B., and Nirmaier, 
H. (1987). Zur hörerbezogenen 
Raumreferenz: Hörerposition und 
Lokalisationsaufwand (Listener-
oriented spatial reference: Listener 
position and localisation effort). 
Sprache Kogn. 6, 126–137.
Huttenlocher, J., and Presson, C. C. (1973). 
Mental rotation and the perspective 
problem. Cogn. Psychol. 4, 277–299.
Keehner, M., Guerin, S. A., Miller, M. B., 
Turk, D. J., and Hegarty, M. (2006). 
Modulation of neural activity by 
angle of rotation during imagined 
spatial transformations. Neuroimage 
33, 391–398.
Kessler, K. (2000). Spatial Cognition and 
Verbal Localisations: A Connectionist 
Model for the Interpretation of Spatial 
Prepositions. Wiesbaden: Deutscher 
Universitäts-Verlag.
Kessler, K., and Thomson, L. A. (2010). 
The embodied nature of spatial 
rEfErEncEs
Arzy, S., Thut, G., Mohr, C., Michel, C. M., 
and Blanke, O. (2006). Neural basis of 
embodiment: distinct contributions of 
temporoparietal junction and extrastriate 
body area. J. Neurosci. 26, 8074–8081.
Baron-Cohen, S. (1989). Perceptual role 
taking and protodeclarative pointing in 
autism. Br. J. Dev. Psychol. 7, 113–127.
Barsalou, L. W. (2008). Grounded cogni-
tion. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 59, 617–645.
Blanke, O., Mohr, C., Michel, C. M., 
Pascual-Leone, A., Brugger, P., Seeck, 
M., Landis, T., and Thut, G. (2005). 
Linking out-of-body experience and 
self processing to mental own-body 
imagery at the temporoparietal junc-
tion. J. Neurosci. 25, 550–557.
Blanke, O., and Thut, G. (2007). “Inducing 
out-of-body experiences,” in Tall 
Tales: Popular Myths About the Mind 
and Brain, ed. S. Della Sala (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press), 425–439.
Brauer, J., Call, J., and Tomasello, M. 
(2005). All great ape species follow gaze 
to distant locations and around barri-
ers. J. Comp. Psychol. 119, 145–154.
Bryant, D. J., Tversky, B., and Franklin, N. 
(1992). Internal and external spatial 
frameworks for representing described 
scenes. J. Mem. Lang. 31, 74–98.
Call, J., and Tomasello, M. (1999). A non-
verbal false belief task: The perform-
ance of children and great apes. Child 
Dev. 70, 381–395.
Chatterjee, A. (2010). Disembodying cog-
nition. Lang. Cogn. 2, 79–116.
Coventry, K. R., and Garrod, S. C. 
(2004). Saying, Seeing and Acting: 
The Psychological Semantics of 
Spatial Prepositions. Hove, New York: 
Psychology Press.
Davidson, M. L. (1972). Univariate ver-
sus multivariate tests in repeated-
measures experiments. Psychol. Bull. 
77, 446–452.
de Vega, M., and Rodrigo, M. J. (2001). 
Updating spatial layouts mediated by 
pointing and labelling under physical 
and imaginary rotation. Eur. J. Cogn. 
Psychol. 13, 369–393.
Flavell, J. H., Green, F. L., and Flavell, E. 
R. (1986). Development of knowledge 
about the appearance-reality distinc-
tion. Monogr. Soc. Res. Child Dev. 51, 
i–v, 1–87.
Frischen, A., Bayliss, A. P., and Tipper, S. 
P. (2007). Gaze cueing of attention: 
visual attention, social cognition, and 
individual differences. Psychol. Bull. 
133, 694–724.
Frith, C. D., and Frith, U. (2007). Social 
cognition in humans. Curr. Biol. 17, 
R724–R732.
Goodale, M. A., and Milner, A. D. 
(1992). Separate visual pathways 
mental own body transformations 
from different visuospatial per-
spectives. Hum. Brain Mapp. 30, 
1801–1812.
Tomasello, M., Call, J., and Hare, B. (1998). 
Five primate species follow the visual 
gaze of conspecifics. Anim. Behav. 55, 
1063–1069.
Tomasello, M., Carpenter, M., Call, 
J., Behne, T., and Moll, H. (2005). 
Understanding and sharing inten-
tions: the origins of cultural cogni-
tion. Behav. Brain Sci. 28, 675–691; 
discussion 691–735.
Tversky, B., and Hard, B. M. (2009). 
Embodied and disembodied cog-
nition: spatial perspective-taking. 
Cognition 110, 124–129.
Ungerleider, L. G., and Haxby, J. V. (1994). 
‘What’ and ‘where’ in the human brain. 
Curr. Opin. Neurobiol. 4, 157–165.
Vasey, M. W., and Thayer, J. F. (1987). The 
continuing problem of false positives 
in repeated measures anova in psycho-
physiology – a multivariate solution. 
Psychophysiology 24, 479–486.
Wilson, M. (2002). Six views of embod-
ied cognition. Psychon. Bull. Rev. 9, 
625–636.
Wraga, M., Shephard, J. M., Church, 
J. A., Inati, S., and Kosslyn, S. M. 
(2005). Imagined rotations of self 
versus objects: an fMRI study. 
Neuropsychologia 43, 1351–1361.
Zacks, J. M., and Michelon, P. (2005). 
Transformations of visuospatial 
images. Behav. Cogn. Neurosci. Rev. 
4, 96–118.
Conflict of Interest Statement: The 
authors declare that the research was 
conducted in the absence of any com-
mercial or financial relationships that 
could be construed as a potential conflict 
of interest.
Received: 15 September 2010; accepted: 
10 November 2010; published online: 06 
December 2010.
Citation: Kessler K and Rutherford H 
(2010) The two forms of visuo-spatial 
perspective taking are differently embod-
ied and subserve different spatial preposi-
tions. Front. Psychology 1:213. doi: 10.3389/
fpsyg.2010.00213
This article was submitted to Frontiers 
in Cognition, a specialty of Frontiers in 
Psychology.
Copyright © 2010 Kessler and Rutherford. 
This is an open-access article subject to 
an exclusive license agreement between 
the authors and the Frontiers Research 
Foundation, which permits unrestricted 
use, distribution, and reproduction in any 
medium, provided the original authors and 
source are credited.
 perspective taking: embodied trans-
formation versus sensorimotor inter-
ference. Cognition 114, 72–88.
Kozhevnikov, M., and Hegarty, M. 
(2001). A dissociation between object 
manipulation spatial ability and spa-
tial orientation ability. Mem. Cognit. 
29, 745–756.
Kozhevnikov, M., Motes, M. A., Rasch, B., 
and Blajenkova, O. (2006). Perspective-
taking vs. mental rotation transfor-
mations and how they predict spatial 
navigation performance. Appl. Cogn. 
Psychol. 20, 397–417.
Leslie, A. M., and Frith, U. (1988). Autistic 
childrens understanding of seeing, 
knowing and believing. Br. J. Dev. 
Psychol. 6, 315–324.
Levelt, W. J. M. (1996). “Perspective taking 
and ellipsis in spatial descriptions,” in 
Language and Space, eds. P. Bloom, M. 
A. Peterson, L. Nadel, and M. F. Garret 
(Cambridge, MA: A Bradford Book), 
77–108.
Levine, M., Jankovic, I. N., and Palij, M. 
(1982). Principles of spatial problem 
solving. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 111, 
157–175.
Mahon, B. Z., and Caramazza, A. (2008). 
A critical look at the embodied cogni-
tion hypothesis and a new proposal 
for grounding conceptual content. J. 
Physiol. Paris 102, 59–70.
Michelon, P., and Zacks, J. M. (2006). Two 
kinds of visual perspective taking. 
Percept. Psychophys. 68, 327–337.
Myachykov, A., Platenburg, W. P. A., 
and Fischer, M. H. (2009). Non-
abstractness as mental simulation in 
the representation of number. Behav. 
Brain Sci. 32, 343–344.
Obrien, R. G., and Kaiser, M. K. (1985). 
Manova method for analyzing 
repeated measures designs – an 
extensive primer. Psychol. Bull. 97, 
316–333.
Pack, A. A., and Herman, L. M. (2006). 
Dolphin social cognition and joint 
attention: our current understanding. 
Aquat. Mamm. 32, 443–460.
Retz-Schmidt, G. (1988). Various views 
on spatial prepositions. AI Mag. 9, 
95–105.
S a m s o n ,  D. ,  Ap p e r l y,  I .  A . , 
Kathirgamanathan, U. , and 
Humphreys, G. W. (2005). Seeing it 
my way: a case of a selective deficit 
in inhibiting self-perspective. Brain 
128(Pt 5), 1102–1111.
Scheumann, M., and Call, J. (2004). The 
use of experimenter-given cues by 
South African fur seals (Arctocephalus 
pusillus). Anim. Cogn. 7, 224–230.
Schwabe, L., Lenggenhager, B., and Blanke, 
O. (2009). The timing of temporopa-
rietal and frontal activations during 
